Knowledge is one of the key determinants in the growth and competitiveness of modern enterprises. Hence, it is essential to analyse the factors that induce employees to exchange knowledge. The problem of sharing an intangible asset — in this case, the knowledge of individuals — can be viewed...

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading...

One of the common challenges exist throughout Europe is to compiling knowledge ready for practice. A key element for development and progress is distributing and sharing the knowledge. With sharing of knowledge is related a number of issues, such as trust (the not surprising conclusion that...

Agent-based models typically involve large numbers of interacting individuals with widely differing characteristics, rules of behavior, and sources of information. The dynamics of such systems can be extremely complex due to their high dimensionality. This chapter discusses a general method for...

Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not...

We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and...

We study the standard reputation model with a long-run (LR) player facing a sequence of short-run (SR) opponents, with one difference: the SR players are uncertain about the monitoring structure, while the LR player knows it. We construct examples where the standard reputation result breaks...

We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Our focus is on equilibria which are robust to the addition of small privately observed shocks to the payoffs. Existing constructions of positive-effort...

We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's...

We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information, valuation equilibrium, which is based on a partition of each player's moves into similarity classes. A valuation of a player is a real-valued function on the set of her similarity classes. In this...