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Grading exams : 100,99,98,… or A,B,C?
Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 1, pp. 72-94
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656827
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Grading in games of status : marking exams and setting wages
Dubey, Pradeep (contributor); Geanakoplos, John (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003468428
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Grading in games of status : marking exams and setting wages
Dubey, Pradeep (contributor); Geanakoplos, John (contributor) - 2006 - Rev.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003468429
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Grading Exams : 100, 99, 98,...Or A, B, C?
Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2009
. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incen­tives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158765
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Grading in Games of Status : Marking Exams and Setting Wages
Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2006
incentives to work are changed. We first apply games of status to grading exams. Our main conclusion is that if students care … are disparate, the optimal wage schedule creates different grades than we found with status incentives alone. The very top … status grades are optimal as we found with status incentives alone. A bonus is paid only to scores in the top status grade …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783453
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Grading Exams : 100, 99, ..., 1, or a, B, C?
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John - 2004
We show that if students care primarily about their status (relative rank) in class, they are best motivated to work not by revealing their exact numerical exam scores (100, 99, ..., 1), but instead by clumping them in broad categories (A, B, C). If their abilities are disparate, the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070454
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Social status and risk-taking in investment decisions
Lindner, Florian; Kirchler, Michael; Rosenkranz, Stephanie - 2019
that professionals show higher levels of intrinsic (self-image) incentives to outperform others compared to non …-professionals (students), but a similar behavior can be sparked among the latter by adding reputational incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001790
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Social status and risk-taking in investment decisions
Lindner, Florian; Kirchler, Michael; Rosenkranz, Stephanie - 2019
that professionals show higher levels of intrinsic (self-image) incentives to outperform others compared to non …-professionals (students), but a similar behavior can be sparked among the latter by adding reputational incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012008982
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Grading exams : 100, 99, ..., or A, B, C? : Incentives in games of status
Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002153187
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Contests for status
Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - In: Journal of political economy 115 (2007) 2, pp. 338-363
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003462805