This paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the sequential Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on...

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G^S^d is defined that has an infinity of weakly...

For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose unique dominant strategies Nash equilibrium implements the Nash solution of the bargaining problem. -- Nash programm ; implementation ; Nash bargaining solution

First via a counter example it is shown that the Proposition 3 of Anbarci & Sun (2013) is false. Then a gap and a mistake in their proof are identified. Finally, a modified version of their Proposition 3 is stated and proved.