Showing 1 - 10 of 127
We study a two-stage R&D project with an abandonment option. Two types of uncertainty influence the decision to start R&D. Demand uncertainty is modelled as a lottery between a proportional increase and decrease in demand. Technical uncertainty is modelled as a lottery between a decrease and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378299
We study different determinants of real-life R&D decisions within a net present value framework. Besides entry threat, Bertrand competition and multi-stage R&D with an abandonment option, our model includes demand uncertainty, modelled as a lottery. A lottery becomes more divergent when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298045
This paper presents an alternative implementation of firm-level collective wage bargaining, where bargaining proceeds as a finite sequence of sessions between a firm and a union of variable size. We investigate the impact of such a `gradual' union on the wage-employment contract in an economy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441532
This paper presents an alternative implementation of firm-level collective wage bargaining, where bargaining proceeds as a finite sequence of sessions between a firm and a union of variable size. We investigate the impact of such a 'gradual' union on the wage-employment contract in an economy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450764
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012039866
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703363
We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) in which the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic welfare maximization. When we relax assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, equilibria other than lexicographic welfare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421741
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333544
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900130
We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383244