I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium...

The Verifiability Approach is a lie detection method based on the insight that truth-tellers provide precise details whereas liars sometimes remain vague to avoid being exposed. We provide a-game-theoretic analysis of a speaker who wants to be acquitted and an investigator who prefers to find...

We consider a disclosure game between a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality of a good, while the buyer does not. Before the buyer decides how many units to purchase, the seller can disclose verifiable information about the good. The better the information, the more the buyer is...

We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete‐information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the...

We characterize global game selections in binary-action supermodular games in terms of sequential obedience: it is shown that an action profile of a binary-action supermodular game is a (possibly noise-dependent) global game selection if and only if it satisfies strict sequential obedience and...

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Neither the agent's effort nor the realizations of his signals are observable. First, we assume that the...

This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For...

Film distributors occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. Cold openings provide a natural field setting to test models of limited strategic thinking. In a set of 856 widely released movies, cold opening produces a significant 15% increase in domestic box office revenue...

This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information,where players are allowed to have heterogenous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under non-common priors if for every incomplete information game...

Fighting collusion has long been a challenge in organizations, whilst favoritism in organizations has long been attacked as one of the most important sources of workplace conflicts. This paper links the phenomena of collusion and favoritism together which seem to be irrelevant. We show that...