of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions …

characterizes the corresponding delta-discounted Shapley value. Moreover, we provide a strategic implementation of these solutions …

In most implementation frameworks, agents care only about the outcome and not at all about the way in which it was … obtained. Additionally, typical mechanisms for full implementation involve the complete revelation of all private information … to the planner. In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their …

rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

equilibrium. Finally, I provide a revelation principle for supermodular implementation in environments with general preferences. …