In higher education pure credit market funding leads to underinvestment while income-contingent loans funding tends to produce overinvestment. We analyze whether a market structure in which both funding schemes coexist and compete against each other might restore efficiency of the educational...

In higher education, pure credit market funding leads to underinvestment due to insufficient risk pooling, while pure income-contingent loan funding leads to overinvestment. We analyze whether funding diversity - a market structure in which credit markets coexist alongside income-contingent loan...

We consider an OLG economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Heterogeneity in individual human capital levels is generated by random innate ability. The production of human capital depends on each individual s investment in education. This investment decision is taken only after...

This paper uses an overlapping generations framework to analyze the implications of different financing regimes in the education sector for human capital formation and economic welfare. Agents privately invest in education after they have received a noisy information signal about their...