We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by … and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling … their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. The equilibrium refinement we propose, in order to rule out …

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by … and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling … compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium …

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by … and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling … compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium …

We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium …

In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and punishment in which equilibrium always exists … sales constraints as equilibrium signals. By specializing the default penalties and imposing an exclusivity constraint on …

The possibility of default limits available liquidity. If the potential default draws nearer, a liquidity crisis may … ensue, causing a crash in asset prices, even if the probability of default barely changes, and even if no defaults … subsequently materialize. Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of …