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The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed‘ Building on the incomplete contracting approach, we argue that the initially specified quantity of an ex ante describable basic good can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210209
We review the literature on public sector outsourcing to explore if the theoretical predictions from the incomplete contracts literature hold up to recent empirical evidence. Guided by theory, we arrange services according to the type and magnitude of their contractibility problems. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022711
There has been a fundamental development in theory and understanding of market, private, collective and public organizations in recent years. This paper incorporates achievements of the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190048
We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This literature has two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348766
We show that privatization can be beneficial even if the government is rational and benevolent, and if the firm …, privatization is strictly preferable if the firm's future survival does not crucially depend on the success of managerial effort. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597691
This chapter surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four main topics that correspond to the major doctrinal divisions of the law of contracts. These divisions include freedom of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023515
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752337
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398756
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399065
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402672