In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing 'relocation' mobility of firms leads to increasing 'net' tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensi.es tax competition, it weakens...

In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing "relocation" mobility of firms leads to increasing "net" tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition, it weakens...

In a multi-country general equilibrium economy with mobile capital and rigidwage unemployment, countries may differ in capital endowments, production technologies and rigid wages. Governments tax capital at the source to maximize national welfare. They account for tax base responses to their tax...

In a multi-country general equilibrium economy with mobile capital and rigid-wage unemployment, countries may differ in capital endowments, production technologies and rigid wages. Governments tax capital at the source to maximize national welfare. They account for tax base responses to their...

In a multi-country general equilibrium economy with mobile capital and rigid-wage unemployment, countries may differ in capital endowments, production technologies and rigid wages. Governments tax capital at the source to maximize national welfare. They account for tax base responses to their...

In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing 'relocation' mobility of firms leads to increasing 'net' tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition, it weakens...

We study a model of tax competition between two countries when both skilled and unskilled workers make their migration decisions simultaneously and wages are endogenously determined. If both factors of production are allowed to migrate freely and when the demand for skilled labor is not so...

This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD's Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a "big bang" multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may...

Since the mid-1990s, countries offering tax systems that facilitate international tax avoidance and evasion have been facing growing political pressure to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information. Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find...

In our paper, we demonstrate that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions...