We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger...

This paper examines the optimal privatization policy in vertically related markets in which an upstream public firm competes with a foreign private rival in supplying a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms in the domestic market. It shows that if the upstream public firm's...

This document, first created in 2007 and last updated in 2010, has now been superseded by the technical discussion in my 2010 article, Privatization, Free Riding, and Industry-Expanding Lobbying, in the International Review of Law and Economics and the plain-English discussion in my 2008...

Several studies on mixed oligopoly indicate that the ownership pattern of firms does not affect the equilibrium price. This idea often suggests that ownership is irrelevant. In a mixed duopoly under price competition, firm ownership is irrelevant. This study reveals that ownership is irrelevant...

We examine tippy network markets that accommodate price discrimination. The analysis shows that when a mild equilibrium refinement, the monotonicity criterion, is adopted, network competition may have a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium regarding the winner's identity; the prevailing brand may...