This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the revealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets; the exercise is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994). We show that...

This paper proves that bargaining can be equivalently depicted in a utility possibility curve, to derive the same unfair Nash solution. This paper confirms that there is no simple solution for bargaining, and that the so-called social indifference curve does not exist

We apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions under which an increase in one's degree of risk...

Our paper considers a 'negotiation game' between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus,...

I present a model in which randomly matched pairs of people bargain over the division of output in each period. Output can be consumed or stored for later consumption. People are identical except possibly in wealth (i.e., the stored output). The one-period utility is linear except for the...

Negotiation involves determining not only an agreement's price, but also its content, which typically has many aspects. We model such negotiations and provide conditions under which negotiation leads to efficient outcomes, even in the face of substantial asymmetric information regarding the...

Are individuals always better off when their preferences can be represented by expected utility?I study this question in a bargaining game where individuals bargain over a pie of fixed size, and I contrast the share received in the long-run by expected utility maximisers with the share they...

We extend the preference domain of the assignment problem to accommodate ordinal, cardinal and mixed preferences together and thereby allow the mechanism designer to elicit different levels of information about individuals' preferences. Given a fixed preference relation over a finite set of...

In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit elegant...

This paper proves that Lindahl has confused cost with benefit. He viewed public good as benefit and people will fight to take a larger share of the good. This paper proves that his model could not accommodate the public good, but the cost of the good. When a person has to take up the burden of...