We analyze the impact of option trading and margin rules on the behavior of informed traders and on the microstructure of stock and option markets. In the absence of binding margin requirements, the introduction of an options market causes informed traders to exhibit a relative trading bias...

We analyze the impact of option trading and margin rules on the behavior of informed traders and on the micro structure of stock and option markets. In the absence of binding margin requirements, the introduction of an options market causes informed traders to exhibit a relative trading bias...

We analyze the impact of option trading and margin rules on the behavior of informed traders and on the microstructure of stock and option markets. In the absence of binding margin requirements, the introduction of an options market causes informed traders to exhibit a relative trading bias...

We analyze the impact of option trading and margin rules on the behavior of informed traders and on the microstructure of stock and option markets. In the absence of binding margin requirements, the introduction of an options market causes informed traders to exhibit a relative trading bias...

We show that the regulation requiring corporate insiders to disclose their trades ex post creates incentives for informed insiders to manipulate the market by sometimes trading against their information. This allows them to increase their trading profits by maintaining their information...

We analyze the information production decision of a manager who can trade on this information and whose compensation is increasing in the stock price. The amount of information produced increases with the stock's volatility and liquidity and decreases with the manager's pay-performance...