The two major paradigmsin the theoretical agency literature aremoral hazard (i.e., hidden action)and adverseselection (i.e., hiddeninformation). Prior research typically solves these problemsin isolation, as opposed to simultaneouslyincorporating both adverseselection and moral hazard features....

We derive a simple formula for the cost of the ESO to the firm at the grant date under the assumption that the executive has a constant market-to-strike multiple. The market-to-strike multiple is defined as the ratio of the market price on exercise to the strike price of the ESO. The expected...

We consider the problem of finding equilibrium asset prices in a financial market in which a portfolio manager (Agent) invests on behalf of an investor (Principal), who compensates the manager with an optimal contract. We extend a model from Buffa, Vayanos and Woolley (2014) by allowing general...

The optimal contracts in portfolio delegation are characterized when the underlying state variable is not contractible and the principal must rely on the final wealth of portfolios to design compensation schemes for the fund manager. We show that finding the optimal contracts for general utility...

The optimal contracts in portfolio delegation under general preferences are characterized when the underlying state variable is not contractible, and the principal must rely on the final returns of portfolios to design the compensation schemes for the fund manager. We show that the optimal...

Previous literature documents that mutual funds' flows increase more than linearly with realized performance. I show this convex flow-performance relationship is consistent with a dynamic contracting model in which investors learn about the fund manager's skill. My model predicts that flows...

The paper broadens the focus of empirical research on salesforce management to include multitasking settings with multidimensional incentives, where salespeople have private information about customers. This allows us to ask novel substantive questions around multidimensional incentive design...

We develop the first structural model of a multitasking salesforce to address questions of job design and incentive compensation design. The model incorporates three novel features: (i) multitasking effort choice given a multidimensional incentive plan; (ii) salesperson's private information...

We analyze the American option valuation problem with the forward performance criterion introduced by Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2008). In this framework, utility evolves forward in time without reference to a specific future time horizon. Moreover, risk preferences change with stochastic market...

We use a version of the Grossman and Hart principal-agent model with 10 actions and 10 states to produce quantitative predictions for executive compensation. Performance incentives derived from the model are compared with the performance incentives of 350 firms chosen from a survey by Michael...