Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

We consider bilateral non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus. Compared to the canonical bargaining game in the tradition of Rubinstein, we introduce additional sources of friction into the bargaining process: Implementation of an agreement and consumption of the surplus can only...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Briber. We argue that when the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This gives rise to a delegation effect, which could undercut corruption as compared to what arises in two...

This paper creates a game theoretic model to determine how pendulum arbitration or baseball arbitration impacts the incentives of litigants. Pendulum arbitration is when both parties submit competing proposals and the arbitrator chooses only one of the bids, in its entirety, to be binding on...

The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act raised the promise of greater individual freedom in defining intimate relationships. This promise, however, was never realized. Due to a number of practical rather than legal constraints, prenuptial agreements remain rare. Postnuptial agreements contracts...

This paper attempts to measure the causal impact of the speed of judiciaries on economic activity by using two novel instrumental variables measuring judicial procedural ambiguity and complexity. Firs, I find that temporally exogenous conflicting judicial decisions taken in India due to the Code...

This paper investigates the impact of judiciaries on firms' contracting behaviour and economic performance. In 2002, the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act was enacted in India to facilitate speedy disposal of civil suits. Some State High Courts had already enacted some of the amendments...

Unfair deals, which are prevalent, do not serve the interests of the harmed party to a deal nor society more generally. This article proposes a theory — here coined ‘deal theory’ — to explain ‘dealor’ behaviours and motivations for offering unfair deals. The theory builds on insights...

The relationship between government-provided contract enforcement and informal trade networks raises important sociological, political, and economic questions. When economic activity is embedded in complex social structures, what are the implications of governmental contract enforcement for the...

In tort litigation, delayed settlement or impasse imposes high costs on the parties and society. Litigation institutions might influence social welfare by affecting the likelihood of out-of-court settlement and the potential injurers' investment in product safety. An appropriate design of...