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Bayesian repeated games and reputations
Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation
Forges, Francoise - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418
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Once beaten, never again : imitation in two-player potential games
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2012
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569667
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Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games
Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2017
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971885
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Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games - Second Version
Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2017
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974183
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Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games
Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2010
We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189386
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Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games
Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2012
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097801
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The economics of transboundary river management
Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - 2014
We survey the economics of transboundary river water allocation, which emerged in the 1960s and has matured over the last decade due to increasing concerns over water scarcity and pollution. We outline the major approaches and pay specific attention to the strategic aspects of transboundary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412473
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Alternating or compensating? : an experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game
Bruttel, Lisa; Güth, Werner - 2013
In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252393
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Evolution of Cooperative Networks
Pandey, Siddhi - 2019
Situations that require individuals to mutually cooperate are often analysed as coordination games. This paper proposes a model of cooperative network formation where the network is formed through the process of the coordination game being played between multiple agents. Additionally, network...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895261