We propose and experimentally test a mechanism for a class of principal-agent problems in which agents can observe each others' efforts. In this mechanism each player costlessly assigns a share of the pie to each of the other players, after observing their contributions, and the final...

We propose and experimentally test a mechanism for a class of principal-agent problems in which agents can observe each others' efforts. In this mechanism, each player costlessly assigns a share of the pie to each of the other players, after observing their contributions, and the final...

We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we assess the performance of the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical...

We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we assess the performance of the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical...