"This paper explores the practice of mortgage refinancing in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. We show that prepayment penalties improve welfare by ensuring longer-term lending contracts, which prevents the mortgage pools from becoming...

This paper studies optimal mortgage design in a continuous time setting with volatile and privately observable income, costly foreclosure, and a stochastic market interest rate. We show that the features of the optimal mortgage are consistent with an option adjustable-rate mortgage (option ARM)....

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of prepayment penalties in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. When considering improvements in the borrower's creditworthiness as one of the reasons for refinancing mortgages, we show that...

This paper considers the optimal design of mortgage backed securities (MBS) in a dynamic setting with moral hazard. A mortgage underwriter with limited liability can engage in costly effort to screen for low risk borrowers and can sell loans to a secondary market. Secondary market investors...

We characterize the optimal mortgage contract in a continuous time setting with stochastic growth in house price and income, costly foreclosure, and a risky borrower who requires incentives to repay his debt. We show that many features of subprime loans can be consistent with properties of the...

This paper studies optimal mortgage design in a continuous time setting with volatile and privately observable income, costly foreclosure, and a stochastic market interest rate. We show that the features of the optimal mortgage are consistent with an option adjustable-rate mortgage (option ARM)....