We examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct monopolist who serves customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that the monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing mechanisms that fully extract the surplus from each consumer....

Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how his decision...

Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the...

In this paper, we explore the economics of free under perpetual licensing. In particular, we focus on two emerging software business models that involve a free component: feature-limited freemium (FLF) and uniform seeding (S). Under FLF, the firm offers the basic software version for free, while...

When an improvable durable good (such as packaged software) saturates the market, the seller could be tempted to release new versions too frequently, hurting her profit. A novel contractual device, which we term as a Free New Version Rights warranty (Free NVR warranty), can help the seller...

This paper examines one of the most important marketing strategies by software producers on the Internet. That is whether to offer free samples and if so, whether to list the samples on shareware repositories. I show that firms with higher value products have a greater incentive to offer free...

This paper proposes a simple model for multiple second-price auctions which run parallel to each other, in the sense that though they might not begin or end at the same time, they have certain periods of overlap. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy of the buyers and the equilibrium...

Italian Abstract: Vengono calcolate le tariffe in due parti ottenute mediante la discriminazione di prezzo monopolistica di I, II e III grado. I tre casi derivano da diverse funzioni obiettivo del monopolista e dai diversi vincoli, dovuti ai diversi gradi di informazione del monopolista rispetto...

Italian Abstract: Sono esaminati i casi di un Principale ed un Agente, in cui il principale possa agire in contesto di monopolio o di concorrenza perfetta, e l'informazione possa essere completa o meno. In particolare per informazione completa viene considerato il caso in cui sia l'azione che il...