We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...

This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...

On November 14th, 2014, SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum – and CNMV, Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores – the Spanish Authority for supervision of securities markets – jointly organized a conference in Madrid: Challenges in Securities Markets Regulation: Investor...

We empirically identify exploratory evidence suggesting the potential for establishing an international corporate governance law protecting investors in relation to the outside directors on the board. Our conclusions are consistent with the principles proposed by OECD in 2004. Our study...

This survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial...

This study is aiming to present (and to a certain extent analyse) the provisions of Articles 24-30 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 “on markets in financial instruments (…)” (‘MiFID II') – including the relevant provisions of the...

This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks' risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity...