Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor's presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation...

I examine a policy-making game among countries that must choose both a policy instrument (e.g., a tax or a quota) and its intensity (i.e., the tax rate or the quota level) to price pollution. When countries price pollution non-cooperatively, they not only set the intensity inefficiently, they...

For a club such as the European Union, an important question is when, and under which conditions, a subset of the members should be allowed to form "inner clubs" and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit, but it generates a freerider...

When making collektive desicions, principals (voters or districts) typically benefit by strategically delegating their bargaining and voting power to representatives different from themselves. There are conflicting views in the literature, however, of whether such a delegate should be...

I investigate when side payments facilitate cooperation in a context with strategic delegation. On the one hand, allowing side payments may be necessary when one party’s participation constraint otherwise would be violated. On the other, with side payments each principal appoints a delegate...

I study dynamic private provision of public goods (or bads) when agents (or countries) can invest in cost-reducing technologies and sign incomplete contracts. The model leads to a dynamic common pool problem that is more severe than its static counter-part. Nevertheless, a sequence of short-term...