This paper makes an attempt at testing the external validity of corruption experiments by moving from the lab in a developed country, to where it matters the most, the field in a developing country. In our experiment a candidate proposes a bribe to a grader in order to obtain a better grade. We...

While incentive framing has been shown to promote workers' effort, little is known about how it affects other dimensions of the employer-employee relationship. This paper examines whether incentive framing can also influence workers propensity to engage in an activity disloyal to their employer:...

Synopsis of whole book instead of Abstract: This volume provides a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence on corruption generated by recent laboratory and field experiments conducted by economists and political scientists. The first part of the volume reviews the evidence produced by...

This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more...

This paper examines the relationship between formalization and firm-level outcomes in Vietnam using a unique panel dataset. Results show that switching firms differ from informal nonswitching firms, confirming heterogeneity. We also find that becoming formal leads to increased profits, value...

Based on a unique panel dataset consisting of both formal and informal firms surveyed every other year from 2005 to 2013, this paper explores the benefits of formalization to the government and firm employees in Vietnam. We find that formalization benefits the government by increasing the amount...