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Administrative regulation of an industry : the cigarette case

Doron, Gideon - In: Public administration review : PAR 39 (1979) 2, pp. 163-170

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Theorizing bureaucratic reputation

Maʾor, Moshe - In: Organizational reputation in the public sector, (pp. 17-36). 2015

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Recruitment and training of senior civil servants in Denmark and Norway, 1970-1995 : the impact of new public management and European integration

Maʾor, Moshe - In: Current politics and economics of Europe 8 (1999) 4, pp. 321-339

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Recruitment and training of senior civil servants in Germany and the UK, 1970-1995 : the impact of new public management and European integration

Maʾor, Moshe - In: Current politics and economics of Europe 8 (1999) 4, pp. 341-355

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The impact of European integration and new public management on recruitment and training of senior public officials : a methodology

Maʾor, Moshe - In: Current politics and economics of Europe 7 (1997) 1, pp. 59-82

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Bonding and bridging associational social capital and the financial performance of local authorities in Israel

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The electoral cycle : a political economic perspective

Doron, Gideon; Tamir, Boaz - In: Crossroads : international dynamics & social change (1983), pp. 141-163

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Evaluating slack in public programs by the experience curves method

Doron, Gideon; On, Uri - In: Evaluating the welfare state : social and political …, (pp. 255-269). 1983

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Organizational reputation in the public sector

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Self-Interest and the Inefficiency of Elected Executives in Matching the Intensity of a Policy Tool to the Intensity of a Policy Problem : Towards a Theorem

Maor, Moshe - 2021

Theoretical models of political agency primarily incorporate elected executives’ self-interest as motivating reelection-seeking behavior. A concerning trend of democratic backsliding and the scholarly recognition that dominant political leaders in democratic regimes are increasingly willing to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226310