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It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526649
signaling incentives under opacity. Our model may also explain the recent trend towards more transparency in monetary policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746680
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787097
This paper studies monetary policy under discretion when the central bank ex ante determines information to be acquired and made public. In a general setting, wherein a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information, I show that an optimal information policy comprises the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026571
This study examines monetary policy and central bank communication when a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information. A novel feature is that the central bank ex ante determines how much information it acquires and how much of this information it releases to the public....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930476
desirable. We show that opacity may lead to the same equilibrium as transparency. However, additional equilibria may emerge … and its effects on inflation and output. In this case, transparency has ambiguous effects. It reduces output variance and … the distortions stemming from heterogeneous information. However, transparency generally raises the variance of inflation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147417
We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181571
A benevolent planner chooses optimally whether and how to disclose publicly a private forecast of fundamentals to a large number of informed small agents. These agents interact in economic environments with information frictions, strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions, and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082668
This paper investigates the characteristics of central bank websites across a large sample of central banks. We systematically derive and quantify these characteristics across three dimensions: text, visual presentation, and website performance. We then conduct a survey to isolate the main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014349276
This Paper, which extends earlier work by Filardo and Guinigundo (2008) and Nelson (2008), reports on a survey conducted in 2007 on the communication practices of 32 members of the Central Bank Governance Network. The questionnaire sent to Network members was divided into two main parts. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095822