We study an equilibrium-based continuous asset pricing problem for the securities market. In the previous work [16], we have shown that a certain price process, which is given by the solution to a forward backward stochastic differential equation of conditional McKean-Vlasov type, asymptotically...

Abstract. A system that allows you to easily regulate the cryptocurrency market and influence it thanks to the classification given by their scalability. The opportunity to be included in a different table will push programmers to adapt to the legislation. It will no longer be the right to have...

Through building the statistical structure of game theory, this paper develops a paradigm of rationality and equilibrium to model collective and interactive behaviors for various economic ecologies from a perfect organizing corporation to a complete freedom population such as an anarchy. In...

We provide a review of the types of equilibria typically found in operations management inventory papers and a discussion on when the commonly used stationary infinite-horizon (open-loop) equilibrium may be sufficient for study. We focus particularly on order-up-to and basestock equilibria in...

In Smirnov and Wait (Games Econ. Behav. 129, 294–309, 2021), an iterative method is devised to identify subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of timing games. This note shows by simple examples that the identification is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient. The main issue is that the...

This paper derives the dynamic implications for price setting in an Edgeworth oligoppoly game with N2 competitors. The impetus to the dynamic game are "conjectured" variations in the prices set by competing firms whereby each firm expresses its belief that a decrease in its own price will be met...

We study a Hotelling framework in which customers first pay a monopoly platform to enter the market before deciding between two competing services on opposite ends of a Hotelling line. This setup is common when modeling competition in Internet content provision. We find that standard...