Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We study the implications of such dual holdings for corporate governance and firm decision-making. We present evidence that dual ownership allows financially distressed firms to increase investments and to refinance by...

We study the decisions and performance of managers who are also chair of the board (duality managers). We hypothesize that duality managers take more risky decisions and deliver worse performance than non-duality managers due to reduced level of control and replacement risk. Using the mutual...

I propose a novel mechanism that explains why index funds may have a beneficial effect on corporate governance. Mutual fund families centralize voting decisions and may have incentives to monitor even when their individual index funds do not. The presence of index funds strengthens the voice...

We examine how boards decide on CEO compensation depending on how informative stock prices are. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decisions, we use extreme mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent with informed boards...

We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors decide how to allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and asset management fees are endogenously determined. Funds' ownership stakes and asset management fees determine...

We examine whether boards are sufficiently well-informed to make efficient decisions on CEO compensation. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decision on CEO compensation, we use mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent...

We investigate whether business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds' proxy voting using a comprehensive data set spanning 2003 to 2011. In contrast to prior literature, we find that business ties significantly influence pro-management voting at the level of individual pairs of fund...

This paper studies how the strength of social ties between the fund's independent directors and fund managers affects fund governance. Using the duration of past employment in which independent directors and fund managers have worked together as a proxy for the social ties, I find that the...

This is the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Mutual funds tend to vote for dissident nominees at firms with weak operating and financial performance, and when dissidents are hedge funds. Notably, passive funds are more likely to support incumbent management than...