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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003833849
This paper examines the chance of winning a Tullock-contest when participants differ in both their talent and their attitude towards risk. For the case of CARA preferences, it is shown that the winning probability may be higher for a low-skilled agent with a low degree of risk aversion than for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008806061
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873797
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172104
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner's expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172435
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012417938
I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalised Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two main results. First, I specify a sufficient condition on the agents' comparative prudence under which a higher common level of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011632254
I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011632264
I investigate a simple model of advance-purchase contracts as a mode of financing costly projects. An entrepreneur has to meet some capital requirement in order to start production and sell the related good to a limited number of potential buyers who are privately informed about their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011595436
I investigate a simple model of advance-purchase contracts as a mode of financing costly projects. The analysis can easily be reinterpreted as a model of the monopolistic provision of excludable public goods under private information. An entrepreneur has to meet some capital requirement in order...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350183