Theory suggests that large firms are more likely to engage in lobbying behaviour and have better bargaining positions against their host governments than smaller entities. Conditional on jurisdiction size, public policy choices are thus predicted to depend on the shape of a jurisdiction's firm...

We examine the effect of local business taxation and local public good and service (PIGS) provision on the number and spatial distribution of new firms. Testing ground is Germany and we rely on the universe of firm foundations between 1998 and 2006. Methodologically, we estimate fixed effects...

We examine the effect of local business taxation and local public good and service (PIGS) provision on the number and spatial distribution of new firms. The analysis draws on panel data for the universe of rm foundations in German municipalities, matched to municipalities' local business tax...

Theory suggests that large firms are more likely to engage in lobbying behaviour and are geographically more mobile than smaller entities. Conditional on jurisdiction size, policy choices are thus predicted to depend on the shape of a jurisdiction's firm size distribution, with more...

Theory suggests that large firms are more likely to engage in lobbying behaviour and are geographically more mobile than smaller entities. Conditional on jurisdiction size, policy choices are thus predicted to depend on the shape of a jurisdiction’s firm size distribution, with more...