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their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way or two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk … higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761639
type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the players' types are … different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317848
model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving … uncertainty in the framework of a 2x2 coordination game, in which one choice leads to the same payoff regardless of the action of … the other person's play. Cheap talk is found to be effective, as there is much more coordination in both Signal treatments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122582
This study experimentally investigates the role of two-sided cheap talk in decisions under asymmetric information. Unlike previous studies, our study also considers endogenous investment timing. In our experiments, subjects play two-player global games with asymmetric information. Before making...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849211
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
how communication mitigates this free-riding problem in an investment-timing game. In our baseline investment-timing game …. If more investors invest at the same time, they share the costs. In the communication treatment, subjects can freely … communicate before choosing the investment time. We find that in groups of two players, communication increases cooperation and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299600
We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011798907
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193