theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to when …

theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to a … possible. However, inefficient equilibria can also exist. If, in equilibrium, experts provide diagnosis-independent treatments …

customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence an expert’s incentive …

customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence an expert’s incentive …

-42, 2006). We consider various markets for credence goods and briefly discuss evidence on the extent of fraud. We then review … the market structure and institutional environment (separation of diagnosis and treatment, liability, verifiability …

trustworthiness on the side of the expert. However, a great amount of empirical and experimental papers document for a range of … different credence goods markets the existence of over-, undertreatment, and overcharging. In this paper, we study two … neutral frame) as well as the identity of the expert (being either a standard student subject or a prospective physician). Our …

our model, an expert enjoys monopoly power on diagnosis and major treatments, but has limited market power on minor … treatments due to fringe competition. The expert's treatment offer only gets revealed to consumers upon visit, and both searching … the expert and fringe firms is costly. For search costs that are not excessively high, in equilibrium the expert …

level of overtreatment. Market efficiency rises as the reduction in treatment costs - due to less overtreatment - exceeds …, however, the overtreatment level does not decrease. …

This paper investigates the impact of four key economic variables on an expert firm’s incentive to defraud its … customers in a credence goods market: the level of competition, the expert firm’s financial situation, its competence, and its …