We present a dynamic model of an IPO market in which firms go public to raise capital for investment. The original shareholders have inside information with respect to the quality of their firm's investment opportunities, and they decide whether to go public, how much capital to raise and...

An enduring puzzle is why credit ratings are coarse indicators of issuer credit quality, with a relatively small number of ratings categories being used to describe credit qualities that lie in a continuum. We develop a theoretical model to explain why ratings are coarse even though coarseness...

An enduring puzzle is why credit rating agencies (CRAs) use a few categories to describe credit qualities lying in a continuum, even when ratings coarseness reduces welfare. We model a cheap-talk game in which a CRA assigns positive weights to the divergent goals of issuing firms and investors....

The search of valuable investment opportunities is one of the fundamental responsibilities of corporate managers. Existing studies of this search process usually model the investment opportunity as a binary signal and the role of the manager ends when such signal arrives. This paper studies a...

We develop a theory of optimal financing for R&D-intensive firms. With only market financing, the firm relies exclusively on equity financing and carries excess cash, but underinvests in R&D. We use mechanism design to examine how intermediated financing can attentuate this underinvestment. The...

We develop a structural model to quantitatively analyze the effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts on capital structure. Capital structure reflects the dynamic tradeoff between the positive incentive effects of managerial optimism and the negative effects of risk-sharing costs....

Using detailed project-level data, we document a novel mechanism through which information externalities distort investment. Firms anticipate information spillover from peers’ investment decisions and delay project exercise to learn from their peers’ outcomes. To establish a causal...

I introduce a model where entrepreneurs self-select into venture capital funds and value-added from venture capitalists (VCs) (i) decreases as their funds grow and (ii) complements entrepreneurs' quality. Aiming to commit high value-added, thereby attract high-quality entrepreneurs, (too many)...

Given the importance of transparency for the governance, efficiency, and stability of banks, we evaluate whether economic shocks that relax a bank's dependence on external capital markets alter the cost-benefit calculations of bank managers concerning voluntary information disclosure. We measure...