We study markets based on the uniform-price double auction with T periods and I traders who have private information about their demands. The model accommodates the heterogeneity in the traders' risk preferences, the statistics of outcomes they condition their demands on, and general...

Privacy is a common concern in markets. We study dynamic markets based on the uniform-price double auction with I heterogeneous traders who have private information. Traders' demand schedules can condition on the statistics of past and current outcomes. Equilibrium strategies depend on the...

This paper examines security design in imperfectly competitive markets in which assets clear separately rather than jointly. Derivatives are generally nonredundant even with zero asset supply. We characterize the scope for introducing nonredundant derivatives and examine the welfare effects of...

Advances in market-clearing technology for multiple assets and synthetic products present alternative ways to leverage complementarities and substitutabilites in asset payoffs. This paper compares their equilibrium and welfare effects. Our results underscore the difference the price impact makes...

Futures contracts have been highly successful financial securities, with substantial trading volumes and active underlying asset markets. In a dynamic market framework, we show that imperfect competition in future spot markets motivates trades in futures contracts in earlier periods. The...