Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 643,602
Cover Image
Collective Dynamic Choice : The Necessity of Time Inconsistency
Jackson, Matthew O. - 2014
We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069088
Cover Image
Regulation As Delegation
Bar-Gill, Oren - 2015
words, government serves as our agent. Understood in light of Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) and Behavioral Principal …-Agent Theory (BPAT), a great deal of modern regulation can be helpfully evaluated as a hypothetical delegation. Shifting from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027459
Cover Image
Authority, Consensus and Governance
Chakraborty, Archishman - 2011
We look for necessary properties of shareholder-value maximizing corporate boards when shareholders face a trade-off between improving information sharing between the board and management and reducing distortions in decision-making arising out of managerial agency. We draw a distinction between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121778
Cover Image
Authority, Consensus and Governance
Yilmaz, Bilge - 2020
We characterize optimal corporate boards when shareholders face a trade-off between improving information sharing between the board and management and reducing distortions in decision making arising out of managerial agency. We show that allocating authority to management is suboptimal....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012825311
Cover Image
The Hazards of Agency
Mitnick, Barry M. - 2009
The theory of agency, which has seen many recent applications in the social sciences and management literatures, is … essentially a theory of failures: It seeks to understand the problems created when one party attempts to control another …. Indeed, applications of agency theory have cut across the economics literature and entered the study of many disciplinary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207256
Cover Image
Present Bias and Collective Dynamic Choice in the Lab
Jackson, Matthew O. - 2014
We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, utilitarian aggregation necessitates a present bias. In lab experiments three quarters of `social planners' exhibited present biases, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065273
Cover Image
Monetary incentives and the contagion of unethical behavior
Le Maux, Benoît; Masclet, David; Necker, Sarah - 2021
We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438251
Cover Image
Moral Hazard and Lack of Commitment in Dynamic Economies
Karaivanov, Alexander - 2012
We revisit the role of limited commitment in a dynamic risk-sharing setting with private information. We show that a Markov-perfect equilibrium, in which agent and insurer cannot commit beyond the current period, and an infinitely-long contract to which only the insurer can commit, implement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107790
Cover Image
Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment
Karaivanov, Alexander - 2013
We analyze dynamic risk-sharing contracts between profit-maximizing insurers and risk-averse agents who face idiosyncratic income uncertainty and can self-insure through savings. We study Markov-perfect insurance contracts in which neither party can commit beyond the current period. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091171
Cover Image
The Social Norm of Tipping : Does it Improve Social Welfare?
Azar, Ofer H. - 2005
Some economists believe that social norms are created to improve welfare where the market fails. I show that tipping is such a norm, using a model in which a waiter chooses service quality and then a customer chooses the tip. The customer's utility depends on the social norm about tipping and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028157