-down auditing using data from a specifically designed bribery lab experiment. I compare “public officials'” tendency to ask for … corruption, even when citizens' “voice” leads to formal punishment with a relatively low probability …

Using the results of a large-scale (N=900) online experiment, this paper investigates how the information about a group … corruption level may harm intergroup relations. Corruption indices are widely used as a measure of quality of governance. But in … additionally informed about the degree of perceived corruption in each region. The presence of corruption information made people …

We conduct a lab experiment to investigate the impact of partisan culture and partisan identity on corruption behavior … members' corruption behavior is insignificant. Our results thus suggest that the prevailing CCP partisan culture is generally … able to undermine the corruption behavior, while the partisan identity itself can work in the opposite direction …

Do crackdowns on bribery exacerbate corruption in the long run? In this paper, we observe the long-run impact of a … that differ in corruption norms, and have very different levels of bribery: US and Pakistan. Bribery is implemented in the …

corruption experiment. The 2x2 between-subject experimental design varies: (i) the availability of information on the geographic …-region.Experimental results show that: (i) knowing the other's region of origin significantly increases the probability of engaging in corruption … contemporary and historical level of civic capital significantly increases the probability of engaging in corruption. Our findings …

corruption risks often observed in negotiated procedures. For rule-based procedures, we show that a "third-price lottery" in …

We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first …-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders … and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly …