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Endogenous labor market cycles
Li, Yunan; Wang, Cheng - In: International economic review 63 (2022) 2, pp. 849-881
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013280171
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Endogenous labor market participation and the business cycle
Häfke, Christian (contributor); Reiter, Michael (contributor) - 2006
Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003297703
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Endogenous Labor Market Participation and the Business Cycle
Häfke, Christian - 2006
Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780475
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A competitive model of worker replacement and wage rigidity
Snell, Andy; Thomas, Jonathan P.; Wang, Zhewei - 2014
We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labour market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237280
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Differentiation and risk aversion in imperfectly competitive labor markets
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2020
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a … variable payments. The degree of competition then determines the structure of these contracts. Three regions can be … distinguished: For low competition, low-ability agents are under-incentivized and exert too little effort. For high competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253127
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Peer effects and incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2014
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents’ incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430294
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Only time will tell : a theory of deferred compensation
Hoffmann, Florian; Inderst, Roman; Opp, Marcus M. - 2018
This paper provides a complete characterization of optimal contracts in principal-agent settings where the agent's action has persistent effects. We model general information environments via the stochastic process of the likelihood-ratio. The martingale property of this performance metric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891844
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Double-sided moral hazard, efficiency wages and litigation
Gürtler, Oliver (contributor);  … - 2007
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003576494
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Effort incentives and on-the-job search : an alternative role for efficiency wages in employment contracts ; conference paper
Herbold, Daniel - 2013
We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent relationship with on-the-job search. On-the-job search is modeled as a dimension of the agent's effort vector that has no effect on output, but raises his future outside option. The agent's incentives to search are increasing in the degree to which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338954
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Double-sided moral hazard, efficiency wages and litigation
Gürtler, Oliver; Kräkel, Matthias - 2007
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383025