possible to uncover with access to the whole distribution and significant size of the offered amounts at each auction. Moreover … with changes in market yields for an extended period after the auction suggesting that purchase operations have a more …

independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …

We extend Wilson (1979) share auction framework to model the uniform-price US Treasury auction as a two-stage multiple … its bidding behavior in handling the risk of being short-squeezed or face the winner curse in the post-auction market …

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

We model the uniform-price US Treasury security auction as a static symmetric game of incomplete information in which … each payer is a primary dealer who submits a demand schedule given two independent sources of private information – his pre-auction … we show how his pre-auction short position impacts his bidding behavior – in particular: the dealer's demand for the …