We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals that inform them of each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a...

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game’s payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other’s private information. We show that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a coordination...

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner similar to a global games setting. On the contrary, if...

This paper develops a method to study how life-cycle utility of a sequence of cohorts converges towards its steady state level in the neoclassical two-generations-overlapping model. This method allows to characterize utility changes associated with variations in exogenous policy parameters along...