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A large body of literature has blamed moral hazard behaviour by banks, for triggering the recent global financial crisis. Many reasons have been cited for such incentive distortion, e.g. the originate-to-distribute approach, regulatory capital arbitrage or the possibility of systemic bailouts....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108280
perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately optimal level of bank leverage is neither too low nor too high: It … substitution induced at high levels of leverage. However, when correlated bank failures can impose significant social costs …, governments may have no option but to bail out bank creditors. Anticipation of this generates an equilibrium featuring systemic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657183
We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced … against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038182
We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced … against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038378
equity and towards deposits when creditor rights become stronger. These results suggest that bank equity, rather than … in bank leverage affect bank risk-taking. We find that increases in creditor rights increase bank risk-taking, but only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078030
The convex payoffs for equity holders in a corporate structure results in agency costs and moral hazard problems. The implicit government guarantee for banks accentuates these. We believe that the Basel III related bail-in contingent convertible (CoCo) structures do only not solve these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994839
The objective of this research is to examine the inter-bank network of clients as a channel for credit risk … banking network channel. There were different models of bank behaviour, from a group of banks that fully aligned their risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013407507
We ask whether the correlation between mortgage leverage and default is due to moral hazard (the causal effect of leverage) or adverse selection (ex-ante risky borrowers choosing larger loans). We separate these information asymmetries using a natural experiment resulting from (i) the unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850423
We address the moral hazard problem of securitization using a principal-agent model where the investor is the principal and the lender is the agent. Our model considers structured asset-backed securitization with a credit enhancement (tranching) procedure. We assume that the originator can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011783323
Both borrowers and lenders can be socially responsible (SR). Ethical banks commit to financing only ethical projects, which have social profitability but lower expected revenues than standard projects. Instead, no credible commitment exists for SR borrowers. The matching between SR borrowers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705659