We examine the role of collateral in a dynamic model of optimal credit contracts in which a borrower values both housing and non-housing consumption. The borrower's private information about his income is the only friction. An optimal contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion...

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different...

The primary means of enforcement of legal liabilities is through the seizure of debtors' assets. However, debtors can shield their assets in various ways and thereby reduce the power of enforcement. This paper studies the circumstances under which a debtor would choose to shield assets and the...

We characterize Contractual Saving for Housing (CSH), a widespread and important product of household housing finance in Continental Europe, as relationship lending that is based on information production about borrowers in preceding saving relationships. In a multi-period partial equilibrium...

With the help of lab experiments we study the impact of discharging insolvent debtors of their residual debt. We investigate the impact of different participation rules and the impact of different types of lenders. We find that higher participation rates encourage risk taking behaviour of...

The usufruct mortgage has received little attention from economists. This paper develops and analyzes a theoretical framework in which the borrower, who mortgages out, and the lender, who mortgages in, a parcel of land reach their decisions in a risky environment when credit and land markets...

We study theoretically and empirically the demand for micro-credit under different liability arrangements and risk environments. A simple theoretical model shows that the demand for joint-liability loans can exceed that for individual-liability loans when risk-averse borrowers value their...

We develop an equilibrium theory of employer-sponsored retirement plan design using a behavioral contract theory approach. The operation of the labor market results in retirement plans that generally cater to, rather than correct, workers' mistakes. Our theory provides new explanations for a...

We construct a two-period model of revolving credit with asymmetric information and adverse selection.In the second period, lenders exploit an informational advantage with respect to their own customers. Those rents stimulate competition for customers in the first period. The informational...

We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information, and from an alternative hidden lender. The presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector. In equilibrium some borrowers obtain...