We analyze the diffusion of rival information in a social network. In our model, rational agents can share information sequentially, unconstrained by an exogenous protocol or timing. We show how to compute the set of eventually informed agents for any network, and show that it is essentially...

We study human trafficking in a marriage market model of prostitution. When trafficking is based on coercion, trafficking victims constitute a non-zero share of supply in any unregulated prostitution market. We ask if regulation can eradicate trafficking and restore the outcome that would arise...

Financing from family and friends is the predominant type of informal finance. This paper proposes a theory that reconciles two seemingly paradoxical traits of this form of finance, namely, it is often provided at negative prices but nevertheless eschewed by borrowers. A central prediction is...

The role of social ties in governance is controversial. We theorize that this ambivalence is natural: Social ties transmit incentives between individuals, so how they affect governance hinges on the specific incentives transmitted. We show this in a principal-supervisor-agent model where the...

Certain markets are illicit because part of the supply is coerced, but little is known about the optimal regulation of such markets. We model a prostitution market with voluntary and coerced prostitutes and ask what regulation can restore the benchmark outcome that would arise under...

The majority of informal finance, in developed and developing countries, is provided by family and friends. Yet existing models of informal finance better fit “informal moneylenders” insomuch as they fail to match two salient characteristics of family finance: family investors often accept...