This paper introduces ambiguous transfers to study the (partial) implementation problem. We show that under all profiles of utility functions, any efficient allocation rule is implementable via an individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers, if and only if the...

Models of generalized recursive utility are becoming increasingly common as alternatives to discounted expected utility theory. These models have successfully explained many so-called, “anomalies” in field data, but often imply that agents have a preference over the timing of uncertainty...

We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer’s value evolves endogenously because of learning-by-consuming. A seller sells one unit of a divisible good, while the buyer relies on his private, rough valuation to choose his first-stage consumption level. Consuming more leads to a more...

The paper examines information structures that can guarantee full surplus extraction via collusion-proof mechanisms. We consider two collusion-proofness notions, the coalition incentive compatibility condition and the robust collusion-proofness condition, and both notions assume that all...