Can an efficient correlated equilibrium emerge without any exogenous benevolent agent providing coordinating signals? Theoretical work in adaptive dynamics suggests a positive answer, which we test in a laboratory experiment. In the well-known Chicken game, we observe time average play that is...

Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical rel evance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population...

Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population...

In traditional sequential search models, players face ex ante uncertainty prior to each search but obtain certain outcomes after the search. The players' reservation value tends to decrease with their level of risk aversion. We propose a modified sequential search model with ex post uncertainty...

In traditional sequential search models, players face ex ante uncertainty prior to each search but obtain certain outcomes after the search. The players' reservation value tends to decrease with their level of risk aversion. We propose a modified sequential search model with ex post uncertainty...

In traditional sequential search models, players face ex ante uncertainty prior to each search but obtain certain outcomes after the search. With the ex ante uncertainty, the players' reservation values and average search duration increase with their level of risk tolerance. We study a...

This paper studies the impact of continuous time interaction on two iconic coordination games: stag hunt and battle of the sexes in a laboratory environment and compare results to possible theoretical explanations. Experimental results show that subjects consistently coordinate better in...