We formulate and solve a costly multi-unit search problem for the optimal selling of a stock of goods. Our showcase application is an inventory liquidation problem with fixed holding costs, such as warehousing, salaries or floor planning. A seller faces a stream of buyers periodically arriving...

We explore the role of prominence in equilibrium pricing in markets where search is sequential and random. Our model key feature is that more prominent firms are more likely to be sampled first. In contrast to ordered-search models, we find that more prominent firms inherit larger but less...

We formulate and solve dynamic programming models extending search theory to (1) multiple indivisible units and (2) perfectly divisible assets. Buyers arrive seeking randomly many units at a random price in (1), or with a random limit order in (2). The seller can partially exercise orders -...

We explore strategic information transmission when there is noise at the observation stage, when an expert observes signals, before he advises a policymaker. That is, the expert might be inexpert. We account for the fact that his signals might be totally uninformative, which is commonly known by...