Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both incumbent and challenger increase their campaign...

Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both incumbent and challenger increase their campaign...

Are elected politicians treated more leniently when facing criminal charges? I present evidence of judicial discretion for the largest democracy in the world, India. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare the probability of a pending criminal case being closed without conviction at...

This paper studies the determinants of conflict and its intensity in a two-stage winner take-all contest model where agents have reference-dependent preferences. First, reference points are crucial in the decision of waging war, and if war is declared it is done by the disadvantaged group, never...

This paper introduces a two-stage winner-take-all contest model with reference-dependent preferences to study the determinants of conflict and its intensity. The existence of a Sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and characterization of the equilibrium are shown. Reference...