Showing 1 - 10 of 11
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334971
We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information, valuation equilibrium, which is based on a partition of each player's moves into similarity classes. A valuation of a player is a real-valued function on the set of her similarity classes. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599386
Traditionally the emphasis in neural network research has been on improving their performance as a means of pattern recognition. Here we take an alternative approach and explore the remarkable similarity between the under-performance of neural networks trained to behave optimally in economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010873642
Bounded rationality and, more specifically, satisficing in game playing assumes choosing strategies by anticipating their likely consequences. Unlike orthodox game theory, one does not require optimality and rational expectations but views satisficing as a reasoning process with several possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011267373
In the stable marriage problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010872187
We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information, valuation equilibrium, which is based on a partition of each player's moves into similarity classes. A valuation of a player is a real-valued function on the set of her similarity classes. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730966
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190635
Bounded rational behaviour is commonly observed in experimental games and in real life situations. Neuroeconomics can help to understand the mental processing underlying bounded rationality and out-of-equilibrium behaviour. Here we report results from recent studies on the neural basis of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671926
We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual “satisfactions”. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized Marriage Problem, comparing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011061411
It is assumed that players bundle nodes in which other players must move into analogy classes, and players only have expectations about the average behavior in every class. A solution concept is proposed for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005557881