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Anti-dumping, Intra-industry Trade and Quality Reversals
Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis; Viaene, Jean-Marie - 2004
-dumping (AD) policy are examined,namely, a price undertaking (PU) and an anti-dumping duty. We show that, when firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325360
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Anti-dumping, intra-industry trade and quality reversals
Moraga-González, José Luis; Viaene, Jean-Marie - 2004
-dumping (AD) policy are examined, namely, a price undertaking (PU) and an anti-dumping duty. We show that, when firms? cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261110
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Mutual Recognition of National Minimum Quality Standards may Support International Convergence
Lutz, Stefan - 2003
and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298134
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Minimum quality standards and novelty requirements in a one-shot development race
Prokop, Jacek; Regibeau, Pierre; Rockett, Katharine - 2009
The authors examine the timing and quality of product introduction in an R&D stopping game, where they allow for horizontal and vertical differentiation in the product market. They observe that discontinuous changes in introduction dates can occur as firms' abilities as researchers change....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298821
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Minimum quality standards and novelty requirements in a one-short development race
Prokop, Jacek; Regibeau, Pierre; Rockett, Katharine - In: Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 4 (2010) 2010-15, pp. 1-49
We examine the timing and quality of product introduction in an R&D stopping game, where we allow for horizontal and vertical differentiation in the product market. We observe that discontinuous changes in introduction dates can occur as firms' abilities as researchers change. Further, when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300296
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Provision of quality and certification intermediaries
Albano, Gian Luigi; Lizzeri, Alessandro - 1997
If buyers do not observe the quality of a product and production of quality is costly, market allocations can be very inefficient. Certification intermediaries are institutions that provide information about quality to buyers. The amount of information in the market determines the incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608311
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Who should pay for certification?
Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland - 2011
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306003
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Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Cavaliere, Alberto - 2004
differentiation, informed consumers exert a positive externality on the purchasers of the high quality good as its price decreases … when the share of informed consumers decreases. Considering also that the price of the low quality good increases with the … with pessimistic consumers we can explain demand collapses and insensitivity to price changes due to consumer suspicions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324907
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Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games
Banerjee, Abhijit; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1996
This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. This set is finite and functionally independent of risk-dominance relations. As the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334873
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An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory
Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334998