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A signalling model of environmental overcompliance
Denicolò, Vincenzo - 2000
I model environmental overcompliance as a signalling device. In the model, a benevolent government may or may not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608640
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Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game
Deissenberg, Christophe; Dawid, Herbert; Sevcik, Pavel - 2004
We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325007
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Environmental Policy à la Carte: Letting Firms Choose their Regulation
Krysiak, Frank C.; Oberauner, Iris Maria - 2008
Environmental policy often has to be devised under informational constraints, like uncertainty and asymmetric information. We consider an environmental policy that aims at reducing the welfare losses caused by asymmetric information while being sufficiently simple for implementation. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390636
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Voluntary environmental agreements, emission taxes and international trade: The importance of the timing of strategies
Conrad, Klaus - 1999
The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A typical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608503
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Environmental Policy, Firm Location, And Product Differentiation: The Role of Green Preferences and Inter-firm Pollution
Kuhn, Michael - 1997
-firm pollution alleviate the tendency of firms to delocate into the region with the weaker regulation; then, a deregulatory race to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319313
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Endogenous environmental policy when pollution is transboundary
Fünfgelt, Joachim; Schulze, Günther G. - 2011
We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self … be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286619
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Umbrella branding and external certification
Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2008
In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264839
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Signaling with performance and the effect of competition
Suzuki, Toru - 2010
Candidates compete to persuade a decision maker. The decision maker wishes to select a candidate who possesses a certain ability. Then, as a signaling, each candidate decides whether to perform a task whose performance statistically reflects the ability. However, since the cost of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281680
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Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model
van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2012
In this paper we study international river pollution problems. We introduce a model in which the agents (countries …) located along a river derive benefit while causing pollution, but also incur environmental costs of experiencing pollution … from all upstream agents. We find that total pollution in the model decreases when the agents decide to cooperate. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326271
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The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
Busch, Lutz-Alexander; Horstmann, Ignatius J. - 2000
We use a two-issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining. We uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are bargained over matters, and what impact the rules for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291973