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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325487

You Don't Always Get What You Pay For

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422168

Nach wie vor kaum Frauen in den Top-Gremien großer Unternehmen

Holst, Elke; Schimeta, Julia - In: DIW Wochenbericht 76 (2009) 18, pp. 302-309

Frauen sind in den Spitzengremien der großen Unternehmen nach wie vor massiv unterrepräsentiert. Immer noch sind die Vorstände nahezu eine reine Männerdomäne: Im Untersuchungszeitraum 2008/2009 waren in den 200 größten Unternehmen außerhalb des Finanzsektors (Top 200) nur 2,5 Prozent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601992

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies

Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert - 2008

Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325683

Dynamic uncertainty and global warming risk

Bosello, Francesco; Moretto, Michele - 1999

When economic agents decide their optimal environmental behavior, they have to take into account non continuos evolutionary trends and irreversible changes characterising environmental phenomena. Given the still non perfect biophysical and economic knowledge, decisions have to be taken in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608543

Disagreement and learning in a dynamic contracting model

Adrian, Tobias; Westerfield, Mark M. - 2006

We present a dynamic contracting model in which the principal and the agent disagree about the resolution of uncertainty, and we illustrate the contract design in an application with Bayesian learning. The disagreement creates gains from trade that the principal realizes by transferring payment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283310

ACE model of endogenous interactions

Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2005

Various approaches used in Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) to model endogenously determined interactions between agents are discussed. This concerns models in which agents not only (learn how to) play some (market or other) game, but also (learn to) decide with whom to do that (or not).

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284102

Ambiguity aversion as a reason to choose tournaments

Kellner, Christian; Riener, Gerhard - 2011

distributions are uncertain, models of ambiguity aversion suggest that tournaments may become more attractive than independent wage … tournaments and independent contracts, which are designed in a way that under uncertainty about output distribution (that is …, under ambiguity), ambiguity averse agents should typically prefer tournaments, while ambiguity neutral agents prefer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281634

Division of Labour and Directed Production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422133

Agency theory meets matching theory

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, J. David - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-33

The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the endogenous payoffs of principals and agents as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496097