The paper discussed the economic theory of international antitrust institutions. Economic theory shows that non-coordinated competition policies of regimes that are territorially smaller than the international markets on which business companies compete violate cross-border allocative efficiency...

This paper presents an overview of recent research in neuroeconomics, in the light of the question how these relate to institutional economics. I present a critique of Glimcher's recent internalist standard model of neuroeconomics and put forward the claim that only an externalist approach can...

In recent extensions of the Darwinian paradigm into economics, the replicator-interactor duality looms large. I propose a strictly naturalistic approach to this duality in the context of the theory of institutions, which means that its use is seen as being always and necessarily dependent on...

The paper tries to improve our understanding on the role of institutions in development by critically examining the current orthodox discourse on institutions and highlighting some of its key problems. After discussing some definitional problems, the chapter examines a number of problems in the...

The role of institutions in the social and economic development is widely recognized in recent literature on economics of institutions. Economic history provides many examples of bad and good institutional structures, environments, and ways of organizing the social life and relationships between...

Collusive agreements in the form of cartels among firms are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on prices and sales quotas that are legally not enforceable. Market characteristics that foster cartels' failure or success are widely examined. However, the interplay between the...

Florian Dorn prepared this study during his doctoral studies at the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich (LMU). The study was completed in September 2020 and accepted as doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics. This dissertation contributes to the empirics of public economics and...

We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem under an inquisitorial and an adversarial competition policy system. Agents' incentives to produce evidence depend critically on the action set of the decision maker. In an inquisitorial system, allowing ex ante for a...

The overall objective of this paper is to contribute conceptually to the questions why and how regions transform and it joins the debate on economic evolution and institutional change. The paper addresses the challenge of how to conceptualise the interdependencies of institutions of different...

The purpose of this paper is to examine the significance of institutional arrangements to development policies. Unfortunately, modern institutionalism has concentrated on the consequences of political and economic liberties (determined by the institutional environment) to development, with...