Showing 1 - 10 of 13,194
We provide characterizations of preferences representable by a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281260
approach for countable domains and combining this with basic measure theory, we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for … the existence of upper semi-continuous utility functions on a wide class of domains. Although links between utility theory … and measure theory have been pointed out before, to the best of our knowledge this is the first time that the present …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281322
backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the … this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280787
Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard … axiom systems behind the Shapley value for an arbitrary exogenous coalition structure leads to the identification of bounds … on players’ payoffs around an “externality-free” value. In endogenizing the coalition structure, we analyze a two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318952
We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r + 1 production factors that is, non atomic measures defined on an interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, economically, can be considered as cornered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319997
character. The grand coalition was always the efficientcoalition,whereas the values of the 2-personcoalitions are varied such … that they lead to an efficiency loss inthe range of6.7 up to 30 percent. Furthermore, the 2-person coalition implies social … huge majority of proposers choosethe inefficient and unfair 2-person coalition. Proposer inducedefficiencylosses vary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324594
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325424
The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608381
international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a … climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge … despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608390
control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to coalition formation is used to analyse profitability and stability of the … countries, carbon leakage reduces the size of the equilibrium coalition and even the likelihood of a successful negotiation. On …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608392