approach for countable domains and combining this with basic measure theory, we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for … the existence of upper semi-continuous utility functions on a wide class of domains. Although links between utility theory … and measure theory have been pointed out before, to the best of our knowledge this is the first time that the present …

backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the … this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached. …

players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called optimal sharing which … stabilises all cartels that are possibly stable under any rule. Under optimal sharing the grand coalition is the unique stable …

the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of con- ractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with … sharing scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition …

Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard … axiom systems behind the Shapley value for an arbitrary exogenous coalition structure leads to the identification of bounds … on players’ payoffs around an “externality-free” value. In endogenizing the coalition structure, we analyze a two …

the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …